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Backdoor listings (BDLs) have long been considered a viable alternative to IPOs for private 
firms seeking to list on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). In 2014, Australia witnessed a 
record number of BDLs, with these transactions being widely reported in the financial media.1 
This recent ‘mining to tech’ backdoor listing trend led Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) Commissioner John Price to raise a number of regulatory concerns about 
the BDL process.2 Despite the popularity of BDLs on the ASX, Brown et al. (2013) is the only 
empirical Australian work that has been published in this area. While Kuo and Humphrey (2002) 
consider some of the key commercial, structural and regulatory issues surrounding BDLs, their 
discussion is largely qualitative in nature, relying mostly on anecdotal evidence. In view of 
this, the objective of this paper is to provide large sample evidence on various facets of BDL 
transactions, including their clustering across time and industry, origin of the private target, 
transaction format, deal size and consideration, regulatory approvals, related-party transactions, 
change of control, capital raisings, and transaction duration.
Backdoor listing defined
Backdoor listing is a loosely defined term that generally refers to a sequence of structured 
intercompany events whereby a private/unlisted firm or asset (target) achieves a listing status 
through a reverse takeover (RTO) of a publicly listed firm (shell), using the corporate shell of the 
latter as a vehicle for going public. Some confusion exists as to what constitutes a BDL and this 
has been reflected in various media reports.
It is important to note that a change of control in the listed entity is critical to the BDL process. 
Without a change of control, the transaction is simply a change in the direction and/or scale 
of a listed entity’s business, with target shareholders having no significant role in the merged 
firm after the takeover.3 We assume a change of control has occurred if target shareholders 
collectively own a majority of the voting rights in the merged entity at the conclusion of the 
RTO prior to any capital raisings. In cases where a majority shareholding is not achieved, it is 
sufficient for target shareholders to have effective control if they, collectively, become the largest 
equity blockholder4 and either dominate the board of directors or occupy the position of CEO/
managing director of the combined firm.
BACKDOOR LISTINGS  
in Australia
We study a large sample of Australian backdoor listings (BDLs) over the period 
from 1994 to 2014. BDLs account for roughly 13 per cent of all firms going public on 
the Australian Securities Exchange and are popular among hi-tech firms and those 
with foreign-domiciled assets. We find that the BDL market is likely influenced by 
the sentiment in the initial public offering (IPO) market, with the number of BDLs 
announced in a year being negatively (positively) correlated with the number of IPOs 
lodged (the percentage of IPOs withdrawn) in the prior year. Contrary to common 
belief, BDL transactions take longer to complete than IPOs, since they typically 
combine both a reverse takeover and the public listing process. Roughly three-
quarters of our sample raised equity capital as part of the BDL process.
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It is important to note that a change of control in the listed entity is critical to the 
BDL process. Without a change of control, the transaction is simply a change in the 
direction and/or scale of a listed entity’s business, with target shareholders having no 
significant role in the merged firm after the takeover. We assume a change of control 
has occurred if target shareholders collectively own a majority of the voting rights in 
the merged entity at the conclusion of the RTO prior to any capital raisings.
Data
Our sample consists of 302 BDLs completed on the ASX between January 1994 and December 
2014. The sample is identified through media search on Factiva. Each case is verified as a genuine 
BDL according to our definition by manual examination of the relevant public announcements 
disclosed by listed shells on Morningstar’s DatAnalysis Premium database. For comparison 
purposes, we obtain a sample of initial public offerings (IPOs) spanning the same time period 
from the Connect4 database.
Distribution of BDLs across years and industries
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of BDLs over the 1994−2014 period together with a breakdown 
by industry. Table 1 presents additional information on both BDL and IPO activity over the same 
time period. It is evident that BDL completion frequency is relatively low before 1999 and peaks 
in 2000 (coinciding with the dotcom bubble with 31 transactions completed). They remain active 
over the ensuing period (2001−04) before tapering off in the lead-up to the global financial crisis 
(GFC) when the IPO market was booming. BDL activity picks up again after the GFC, cumulating 
in another record year in 2014. Overall, BDLs account for 13 per cent of all firms going public 
during the 1994−2014 period.
TABLE 1: Distribution of BDLs and IPOs by year
 BDL IPO All going-public
 Announced Completed Lodged Listed Withdrawn Transactions






1994 11 3.5 8 2.6 114 4.9 90 4.5 18 15.8 98 8.2 91.8
1995 7 2.2 7 2.3 44 1.9 37 1.8 4 9.1 44 15.9 84.1
1996 5 1.6 6 2.0 78 3.3 68 3.4 6 7.7 74 8.1 91.9
1997 7 2.2 6 2.0 79 3.4 76 3.8 9 11.4 82 7.3 92.7
1998 4 1.3 7 2.3 45 1.9 47 2.3 1 2.2 54 13.0 87.0
1999 26 8.2 13 4.3 112 4.8 106 5.2 1 0.9 119 10.9 89.1
2000 24 7.6 31 10.3 195 8.4 149 7.4 37 19.0 180 17.2 82.8
2001 21 6.6 16 5.3 70 3.0 59 2.9 20 28.6 75 21.3 78.7
2002 25 7.9 23 7.6 75 3.2 66 3.3 15 20.0 89 25.8 74.2
2003 19 6.0 21 7.0 110 4.7 91 4.5 8 7.3 112 18.8 81.3
2004 13 4.1 20 6.6 182 7.8 161 8.0 16 8.8 181 11.0 89.0
2005 16 5.0 12 4.0 191 8.2 172 8.5 20 10.5 184 6.5 93.5
2006 8 2.5 12 4.0 203 8.7 181 9.0 18 8.9 193 6.2 93.8
2007 9 2.8 11 3.6 250 10.7 247 12.2 22 8.8 258 4.3 95.7
2008 13 4.1 11 3.6 59 2.5 42 2.1 16 27.1 53 20.8 79.2
2009 17 5.4 16 5.3 48 2.1 38 1.9 5 10.4 54 29.6 70.4
2010 24 7.6 14 4.6 138 5.9 100 4.9 16 11.6 114 12.3 87.7
2011 9 2.8 19 6.3 114 4.9 106 5.2 28 24.6 125 15.2 84.8
2012 15 4.7 10 3.3 69 3.0 49 2.4 20 29.0 59 16.9 83.1
2013 16 5.0 16 5.3 62 2.7 59 2.9 13 21.0 75 21.3 78.7
2014 28* 8.8 23 7.6 94# 4.0 78 3.9 4 4.3 101 22.8 77.2
Total 317 100.0 302 100.0 2332 100.0 2022 100.0 297 12.7 2324 13.0 87.0
Notes: *Includes 16 BDLs that are still ongoing. #Includes 14 IPOs that are upcoming floats.
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TABLE 2: Correlations between BDL and IPO markets
(t) (t-1) (t-2)
# IPOs lodged
# BDLs announced (t) 0.043 -0.265 -0.106
% IPO withdrawn
# BDLs announced (t) 0.081 0.208 0.322
The correlation coefficient (Table 2) between the number of BDLs announced in year t and the 
lagged (year t–1) number of IPOs lodged is -0.265. This seems to suggest that when the IPO 
market is booming, there is less demand for BDLs. In addition, the number of BDLs announced 
in year t is positively correlated with the percentage of IPOs withdrawn in year t–1 (ρ=0.208) 
and year t–2 (ρ=0.322). If a high percentage of IPOs withdrawn is a proxy for unfavourable IPO 
market conditions, the positive correlation indicates a higher subsequent demand for BDLs as an 
alternative route to public listing (i.e. a substitution effect).
FIGURE 1: Distribution of backdoor listings across years and industries
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In terms of industry breakdown, Figure 1 shows technology firms (IT and telecommunications) 
dominate the two BDL peak years of 2000 and 2014, whereas the 2001−04 period has seen 
increased participation from the healthcare sector (biotechnology and life science firms). 
BDLs from the energy and materials sectors played a greater role during the 2007−13 period, 
coinciding with the later stages of the mining boom and subsequent downturn.
TABLE 3: Breakdown of BDLs and IPOs by industry sector, 1994–2014
Transaction 
type
Global Industry Classification Standard
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 Total
BDL 10.3% 16.9% 9.6% 10.3% 3.0% 11.9% 10.3% 18.5% 8.6% 0.7% 100.0%
IPO 10.2% 35.4% 9.4% 9.6% 2.4% 7.3% 14.7% 7.6% 2.1% 1.5% 100.0%
Note: The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors are: energy (10), materials (15), industrials (20), 
consumer discretionary (25), consumer staples (30), health care (35), financials (40), information technology (45), 
telecommunication services (50), and utilities (55).
In aggregate, Table 3 shows IPOs are more concentrated than BDLs in the materials 
(35.4 per cent vs 16.9 per cent) and financial (14.7 per cent vs 10.3 per cent) sectors, 
whereas BDLs are more concentrated than IPOs in the health care (11.9 per cent vs 7.3 per cent), 
information technology (18.5 per cent vs 7.6 per cent) and telecommunications (8.6 per cent vs 
2.1 per cent) sectors.
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Target domicile




North Asia 21 7.0
Southeast Asia 20 6.6
North America 15 5.0
Africa 13 4.3
South Pacific 11 3.6
Europe 9 3.0
South America 5 1.7
Other 5 1.7
Total 302 100.0
The ASX is a popular destination for BDL by foreign firms (Table 4). Of the 302 BDLs sampled, 
close to one-third (99 cases or 32.8 per cent) of the targets are foreign (either their operations 
or assets are located outside of Australia). Asia is the leading source of foreign targets, with 
21 and 20 of them originating from North Asia (predominately, China) and Southeast Asia 
(predominately, Singapore and Indonesia), respectively. Other significant sources of foreign 
targets include North America (15), Africa (13) and South Pacific (11, including New Zealand). By 
industry, the majority (51 cases or 51.5 per cent) of foreign targets are in the extractive industries 
(energy and materials). Indeed, 66.2 per cent of all extractive industry targets have their 
tenements/projects overseas.
Transaction format
TABLE 5: Transaction format
Transaction format No. %
Share sale agreement 261 86.4
Public takeover 16 5.3
Scheme of arrangement 5 1.7
Acquisition of business and assets 20 6.6
Total 302 100.0
Table 5 shows the vast majority (261 cases or 86.4 per cent) of BDLs are structured by way of a 
share sale agreement. This is the case if the target is incorporated as a private company. If the 
target is an unlisted public company, the transaction has to be structured as a public, off-market 
takeover (16 cases or 5.3 per cent). In five BDL cases (1.7 per cent), the transaction is conducted 
as a scheme of arrangement, whereby shareholder approvals and formal court sanctions are 
required. The remaining 20 cases (6.6 per cent) are acquisitions of businesses and assets, 
popular if the private target is a real estate development asset.
Deal size and consideration paid
TABLE 6: Deal size, consideration and shareholding by target 
 Variable No. Mean Median SD Min Max
Deal size ($m) 302 38.4 12.8 107.0 0.6 1168.1
Cash consideration ($m) 302 1.8 0.0 7.9 0.0 94.8
Share consideration ($m) 302 36.5 11.6 106.3 0.6 1168.1
Shareholding by target (%) 302 65.8 66.7 18.2 20.5 99.4
Note: All dollar values have been converted to 2014 dollar terms using the Consumer Price Index published by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
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BDLs are typically small deals (Table 6). In 2014 dollar terms, the average deal size in our sample 
is $38.36 million, with a median of $12.76 million, indicating skewness to the right tail. The 
smallest and largest deals are $0.64 and $1,168 million, respectively. This contrasts with a mean 
(median) deal value of $821.44 ($133.19) million for a sample of 912 other successful acquisitions 
(other than RTOs) announced during the 1997−2014 period.5 Note that our measure of deal size 
includes only consideration paid by the shells in the form of cash (average $1.8 million) and shares 
(average $36.5 million), suggesting shares account for 95.2 per cent of the total consideration 
paid. Contingent claims have also been used as a form of payment in BDL transactions. In 
total, 113 cases (37.4 per cent) involved options as part of the consideration and 60 cases 
(19.9 per cent) involved earn-outs or deferred payments that depend on certain pre-determined 
performance hurdles being achieved by the target. Earn-outs are common among BDL deals 
where the target is involved in technology or mining/exploration businesses and are seen as a 
way of protecting the shell shareholders from the inherent risk associated with the target.6
Regulatory approvals
In Australia, there is no formal regulation of BDLs per se. There are, however, provisions in the 
Corporations Act and the ASX Listing Rules that may become operative and applicable to certain 
aspects of a BDL. The Corporations Act s 606 generally prohibits a person, or parties acting in 
concert, from acquiring a relevant interest in the voting shares of a public company if, because 
of the transaction, that person’s voting power in the company increases from 20 per cent or 
below to more than 20 per cent. Section 611(7) provides an exemption to the prohibition if an 
acquisition is approved previously by shareholders by a resolution passed at a general meeting. 
To assist shareholders in assessing the merits of the transaction, the law also requires that 
shareholders be given all information material to the decision on how to vote on the resolution. 
In practice, an independent expert’s report will normally be required, expressing an opinion on 
the fairness and reasonableness of the transaction to shareholders. Table 7 reveals that of all 302 
transactions in the sample, the takeovers provisions are invoked in 212 cases (70.2 per cent).
TABLE 7: Regulatory approvals
Approval type No. %
Corporations Act — Section 606
Invoked 212 70.2
Not invoked 90 29.8
ASX change of activity
No significant change 14 4.6
Change to nature 45 14.9
Change to scale 51 16.9
Change to both nature and scale 192 63.6
ASX re-admission requirement
No re-admission requirement 32 10.6
Re-compliance with Chs. 1 and 2 of Listing Rules 229 75.8
Shareholder approval only 41 13.6
Related-party transaction
Related 66 21.8
Not related 236 78.2
Name change
No change 59 19.5
Changed 243 80.5
Prospectus 
Not required 78 25.8
Required 224 74.2
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ASX Listing Rule 11.1 deals with any proposed significant change to the nature or scale of 
activities by listed entities. Depending on how significant the change of activity is, the ASX may, 
at their discretion, require the listed entity to obtain shareholders’ approval at a general meeting 
and re-comply with the requirements of Chapters 1 and 2 of the Listing Rules again as if the entity 
is applying for admission to the ASX official list. As Table 7 suggests, only 14 BDL transactions 
(4.6 per cent) do not constitute a significant change of activity. The remaining 288 cases are 
classified as significant changes of activities in nature (45 cases or 14.9 per cent), scale (51 cases 
or 16.9 per cent) or both (192 cases or 63.6 per cent). In excess of 80 per cent of all BDLs are 
also associated with the shell changing its name. In most cases the name changes to that of 
the target.
In terms of re-admission requirements (Table 7), 229 BDL cases (75.8 per cent) are required by 
the ASX to re-comply with Chapters 1 and 2 of the Listing Rules as if they are applying for a new 
listing while 41 cases (13.6 per cent) require shareholders’ approval only. No shareholder approval 
or re-admission requirements are imposed on the remaining 32 cases (10.6 per cent). Close 
to three-quarters (74.2 per cent) of all BDLs issued some form of a prospectus or information 
memorandum for re-compliance and/or capital raising purposes.
Related-party transactions
Table 7 also reports that of all the 302 BDLs, 66 cases (21.8 per cent) are considered related-
party transactions. These transactions involve one or more of the vendors of the target being 
a director and/or substantial shareholder of the shell at the time when the transaction was 
announced. This indicates vendors of the target might already have a toehold in the shell 
before the transaction. As a safeguard against conflict of interest, related-party transactions 
are regulated by Chapter 2E of the Corporations Act and Chapter 10 of the ASX Listing Rules, 
requiring shareholder approval at a general meeting.
Change of control
TABLE 8: Change of control
Control type No. %
Majority shareholding 238 78.8
Largest blockholder + BOD + CEO/MD 38 12.6
Largest blockholder + BOD 5 1.7
Largest blockholder + CEO/MD 21 7.0
Total 302 100.0
Target shareholders, on average, obtained 65.8 per cent of the shareholding in the merged entity 
at the conclusion of the RTO (prior to any concurrent capital raisings), with a range between 
20.5 per cent and 99.4 per cent (Table 6). By control type, Table 8 reveals target shareholders 
gained control by acquiring a majority of the voting rights in the merged entity in 238 cases 
(78.8 per cent). Of the remaining 64 cases, target shareholders obtained control by becoming 
the largest blockholder of the merged entity (with a shareholding of between 20 per cent and 
50 per cent) and dominating either the board of directors (5 cases or 1.7 per cent) or the CEO/
managing director (21 cases or 7.0 per cent) or both (38 cases or 12.6 per cent).
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Concurrent capital raisings
TABLE 9: Capital raisings
Raising type No. Mean Median SD Min Max Sum
BDLs
No capital raising 68 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public offer ($m) 148 7.4 4.8 10.8 0.2 102.5 1098.4
Private placement ($m) 46 8.7 3.5 14.4 0.1 72.9 401.4
Rights issue ($m) 8 13.7 6.4 16.9 2.5 52.6 109.5
Mixed offer ($m) 32 13.3 6.3 24.9 0.8 139.5 426.6
Total ($m) 302 6.7 3.2 13.3 0.0 139.5 2035.9
IPOs
Public offer ($m) 2022 94.6 9.7 590.2 0.3 22404.0 191306.3
Note: All values are converted to 2014 dollar terms using the Consumer Price Index published by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics.
Not all BDLs involve capital raisings. As Table 9 shows, 68 cases (22.5 per cent) did not raise 
any equity capital, suggesting the shell was essentially a cash box or market conditions were 
not favourable for raising capital at the time. For the remaining 234 cases where capital raisings 
are involved, the mean and median proceeds (in 2014 dollars) are $8.7 million and $4.8 million, 
respectively. The smallest amount of capital raised is a mere $0.12 million while the largest raising 
is $139.5 million. In terms of capital raisings by type, 148 cases are public offers, 46 cases are 
private placements, eight cases are rights issues and 32 cases involve mixed offers (more than 
one offer type).
Transaction duration
TABLE 10: Transaction duration (days)
 No. Mean Median SD Min Max
All BDLs 302 174.3 139.5 122.8 36 1216
ASX re-compliance requirement
Yes 229 189.1 155 131.1 41 1216
No 73 127.8 108 76.1 36 541
Capital raisings
Yes 234 184.3 148.5 131.8 38 1216
No 68 139.5 126.5 76.2 36 541
By capital raising type
Public offer 147 194.6 162 139.9 50 1216
Private placement 46 155.4 120.5 93.3 43 394
Rights issue 8 153.0 138 111.0 38 405
Mixed offer 32 190.5 135 142.8 41 618
By transaction format
Share sale agreement 261 170.6 135 125.8 36 1216
Public takeover 16 182.6 162 77.4 93 390
Scheme of arrangement 5 212.0 180 95.8 134 363
Acquisition of business and assets 20 205.9 185 119.2 64 418
All IPOs
From lodgement to listing 2022 60.2 51 34.7 12 414
From kickoff to listing 2022 102.2 93 34.7 54 456
Market folklore has it that it is quicker to complete a BDL than an IPO in the process of going 
public. Table 10 presents evidence on the duration (in days) of BDL transactions, measured from 
the first announcement date by the shell to the completion date, where the latter is taken as 
the date the merged entity is re-admitted to the ASX (if re-compliance with Chapter 1 and 2 of 
Listing Rules is required) or the official date the RTO is completed (if no re-admission to the ASX 
is required). For BDLs, the mean (median) duration is 174.3 (139.5) days, respectively. Due to an 
outlier (max = 1,216 days), we focus on the median rather than the mean.
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Sub-sample results show BDL transactions with ASX re-admission requirements (155 days) 
generally take longer to complete than those without re-admission requirements (108 days). 
Cases with concurrent capital raisings (148.5 days) require more time to complete than those 
that raise no capital (126.5 days). By capital raising type, BDLs with public offers take the longest 
(162 days) while those with private placements take a median of 120.5 days, with rights issues 
and mixed offers lying in between. In terms of transaction type, BDLs structured as share sale 
agreements are the fastest to execute (135 days), followed by off-market public takeovers 
(162 days). Scheme of arrangement transactions tend to take longer to complete (180 days), 
probably due to the more formal procedures (e.g. court sanctions) involved. Interestingly, 
BDLs structured as acquisitions of business and assets have the longest transaction duration 
(185 days).
For comparison, we compute two measures of transaction duration for our IPO sample. The first 
measure captures the number of days from the prospectus lodgement date with ASIC to the 
listing date. The mean (median) IPO duration is 60.2 (51) days, respectively, which is shorter than 
that for BDL transactions. We obtain a second measure of IPO duration (from date of kick-off 
meeting between IPO firm and investment bankers/underwriters until listing date) by adding 
42 days7 to our first measure. This results in a mean (median) IPO duration of 102.2 (93) days, 
which is still lower than that for BDLs. Note that the duration measure for BDLs does not take 
into consideration the initial planning and negotiation stages undertaken by the target prior to 
the formal deal announcement by the shell. Kuo and Humphrey (2002) estimate it typically takes 
a target up to four weeks from the initial appointment of advisers through to execution of the 
term sheet with the shell. Adding another four weeks to our BDL duration measure would render 
the difference between the two types of going-public transactions even greater.
Conclusion
Evidence from a sample of 302 Australian BDLs suggests they are not necessarily simpler or 
faster than the IPO process. BDLs are essentially a combination of a RTO and the public listing 
process. As a result, more regulatory approvals are required and they take longer to complete 
than IPOs. This finding has implications for entrepreneurs/owners of private firms contemplating 
a public listing via the backdoor route.
Evidence from a sample of 302 Australian BDLs suggests they are not necessarily 
simpler or faster than the IPO process. BDLs are essentially a combination of a RTO 
and the public listing process. As a result, more regulatory approvals are required and 
they take longer to complete than IPOs. This finding has implications for entrepreneurs/
owners of private firms contemplating a public listing via the backdoor route.
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Notes
1.  See, for example, ‘Record numbers queuing up for backdoor listings’ by Nick Abrahams published in The Australian 
Financial Review on 30 September 2014.
2.  ‘ASIC raises red flag over “mining to tech” backdoor’, by Tess Ingram published in The Australian Financial Review 
on 31 July 2014.
3.  For example, the listed firm can acquire the private target by paying all (or majority of) the consideration in cash.
4.  We require target shareholders to own at least 20 per cent of the shares in the merged entity.
5.  This sample of other acquisitions is obtained from the Connect4 database.
6.  The lack of information in assessing the value of these contingent payments means they are not included in our 
calculation of deal size.
7.  Evidence from Floros and Shastri (2010) on US penny stock IPOs shows that the median duration between the 
kick-off meeting and prospectus registration date is approximately 42 days.
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